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Abstract 
 
  In the context of rising government debt levels in advanced economies and the 
ongoing euro zone debt crisis, there has been a revival of academic and policy debate 
on the impact of growing government debt on economic growth. This data-rich study 
offers an econometric investigation of the macroeconomic determinants of government 
debt and answers the much-debated question – What factors influence the government 
debt in a sovereign country? The study provides analyses for economy groupings, 
political governance groupings and income groupings of countries in addition to the full 
sample. Panel Granger causality testing is employed to establish causality running from 
the determinants of debt. The results of the full sample analysis reveal that real GDP 
growth, foreign direct investment, government expenditure, inflation and population 
growth have negative effect on debt. Gross fixed capital formation, final consumption 
expenditure, and trade openness have positive effect on debt. The results for different 
country groupings bring out some interesting implications.    
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1. Introduction 
  In the aftermath of global financial crisis, government debt of sovereign countries has 
risen by $25 trillion, of which the advanced economies account for $19 trillion – a direct 
result of severe recession, fiscal‐stimulus programs, and bank bailouts. The government debt 
trajectories in some advanced economies have touched unsustainable levels
1
. Many countries 
in the euro zone are struggling with a combination of high levels of indebtedness, budget 
deficits and frail growth. While much of this debt upsurge was perhaps driven by efforts to 
support economic growth in the face of deflationary headwinds in the post-crisis scenario, 
there is a need for thorough econometric investigation to know what causes the government 
debt to rise. There is a rising concern to comprehensively analyse debt dynamics and debt 
overhang. While the much-debated question has been - ‘do sovereign countries with high 
government debt tend to grow slowly’, the associated issue has been – ‘what macroeconomic 
factors cause the debt of sovereign countries to rise’. The discussion on government debt 
levels and related economic growth has thus gained sudden attention for many researchers. 
 
 Reinhart and Rogoff (RR), in some of their influential articles, argue that higher levels 
of government debt are negatively correlated with economic growth, but that there is no link 
between debt and growth when government debt is below 90% of GDP (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2010a; Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff 2012). RR’s findings have sparked a new literature 
seeking to assess whether their results were robust to allow for non-arbitrary debt brackets, 
control variables in a multivariate regression setup, reverse causality, and cross-country 
heterogeneity. After the publication of the (critique) article by Herndon, Ash, and Pollin 
(2014) challenging some of RR’s findings, the discussion on the relationship between debt 
and growth in advanced economies has become more animated. Krugman (2010), citing the 
case of Japan, argues that the link between debt and growth could be driven by the fact that it 
is low economic growth that leads to high levels of government debt.  
 
 The evolving empirical literature reveals a negative correlation between government 
debt and economic growth. This correlation becomes particularly strong when government 
debt approaches 100% of GDP (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010a; 2010b; Kumar and Woo 2010; 
                                                          
1 For instance, the United States’ debt level which was 75 percent of GDP in 2008 has risen to 109 in 2013; the United 
Kingdom’ debt level has scaled from 58 to 108 during the same period. Australia’s debt level has surged from 12 to 23 
percent of GDP. In the case of Japan, the debt level has moved from 192 to 241. In the case of euro zone economies, the 
surge in debt levels is still higher. For the Italy, the debt level has surged from 117 to 144. France’s debt has moved from 79 
to 114 and similarly, Portugal’s debt has risen from 72 to 115.   
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Cecchetti et al. 2011). Empirical research, of late, has begun to focus on possibilities of non-
linearities within the debt-growth nexus, with specific attention to high government debt 
levels. The empirical literature on this issue remains sparse as very few studies employ non-
linear impact analysis. Cecchetti et al., (2011) employ non-linear panel threshold approach 
for non-dynamic panels. However, the available literature does not provide an examination of 
the cause-effect relationship to reveal the dynamics of government debt-economic growth 
nexus. 
 
 We notice four inadequacies in the empirical literature on debt-growth nexus. First, 
there is a need to expand the horizon of the data sample, as averaging across OECD / 
advanced countries alone would make such inferences difficult. Second, none of the studies 
has focused on the different groupings of economies based on their political governance 
structures, economy groupings and income groupings in addition to the full sample. Third, we 
do not find studies that diagnose government debt-growth nexus in terms of the 
macroeconomic determinants of government debt. Fourth, none of the studies has offered an 
analysis based on causality testing to ascertain the direction of causality between debt and 
growth. 
 
 This study endeavours to fill the above research gap providing a sound empirical 
investigation based on well-established theoretical considerations. We identify the 
macroeconomic determinants government debt in the context of debt-growth nexus by 
employing panel GMM regressions for balanced-panel data. This study is unique as it 
overcomes the issues related to data adequacy, coverage of countries, heterogeneity, 
endogeneity, and non-linearities. We contribute to the current strand of literature on 
government debt and economic growth by extending the horizon of analysis by exploring 
considerably a large worldwide full sample covering 46 countries for the period 1980-2009. 
We cover 82 countries under economy groupings, 50 countries under income groupings and 
58 countries under political governance groupings in our analysis. We provide a thorough 
econometric estimation including specification that allows for IV approach. Our data-
intensive approach offers stylized facts, well beyond selective anecdotal evidence. This paper 
makes a distinct contribution to the debate by offering new empirical evidence based on a 
sizeable dataset. 
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 The paper is organised as follows. We present our data in section 2. We provide in 
section 3, a detailed econometric analysis of the macroeconomic determinants of government 
debt for different country groupings and for the full sample and a discussion on the results. 
Section 4 describes the causality testing and we conclude in section 5. 
 
2. Data 
 Our dataset comprises annual macroeconomic data on 252 countries, over the period 
1980-2009. To maintain homogeneity in as much as it is for a large sample of countries over 
the course of five decades, we employ as a primarily source – World Development Indicators 
(WDI) database 2014 of World Bank. We strengthen our data with the use of supplementary 
data sourced from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2014 database, 
International Financial Statistics and data files, and Reinhart and Rogoff dataset on Debt-to-
GDP ratios. 
   
 We arrange our sample data into five broad categories: (i) economy groupings, (ii) 
income groupings, and (iii) political governance groupings. We place each of the countries in 
the WDI list into its relevant category of country groupings. However, each country’s entry 
into the group is dependent on the data adequacy. Exclusion of any country of the WDI list 
from our sampling is solely due to data considerations (either non-availability or inadequacy 
of data.). Some of the countries could not make into the detailed econometric analyses, for 
lack of complete data for the stated variables for the required period in executing the panel 
GMM IV approach based regressions. The list of countries covered in detail under different 
groupings and sub-groupings is provided in annexure 1 to 3.  
 
Economy Groupings 
 The World Economic Outlook April 2011 of IMF
2
guides our classification of countries 
into advanced, emerging and developing economies. We consider two more broad groupings: 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and OECD
3
 (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development). Table 1 provides sample description for economy 
groupings. 
 
                                                          
2 World Economic Outlook April 2011 of IMF (Table 4.1: Economy groupings) is available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf 
3 The details about OECD members are available at http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-
countries.htm 
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Table 1: Sample description for economy groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for economy groupings 
Period Advanced Emerging OECD BRICS Developing Total 
1980-2009 34 22 34 5 80 175 
Panel B: Government Debt and GDP Growth in economy groupings 
Countries observations Economies 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
32 640 Advanced 2.39% 2.83% 57.12 53.38 
5 100 BRICS 4.32% 4.70% 46.65 46.79 
57 1140 Developing 3.36% 4.26% 71.63 56.67 
21 420 Emerging 3.41% 4.70% 43.73 41.35 
33 660 OECD 2.64% 2.90% 55.17 51.61 
Total=148 2960 
     
 
Income Groupings 
 In arranging the data for income groupings, we follow the World Bank classification of 
economies
4
updated for the fiscal year 2015. We consider high-income economies (HIC), 
heavily indebted poor countries (HPC), least developed countries (LDC), low-income 
economies (LIC), and middle-income economies (MIC). Table 3 provides the description of 
our sample based on income groupings. 
 
Table 2: Sample description for income groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for income groupings 
Period Middle-income (MIC) High-income (HIC) Heavily indebted poor (HPC) Total 
1980-2009 62 44 19                       125 
Panel B. Government Debt and GDP Growth in Income groupings 
Countries Observations Economies 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
38 760 High-income countries (HIC) 2.62% 3.10% 49.99 45.89 
16 320 
Heavily indebted poor 
countries (HPC) 
3.12% 3.95% 124.10 103.87 
34 680 
Middle-income countries 
(MIC) 
3.72% 4.56% 52.17 42.73 
Total=88 1760 
     
 
                                                          
4 World Bank country classification is available at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups Accordingly, 
low income countries are those with gross national income (GNI) per capita of $1,045 or less; middle income countries, 
$1,046–12,745; high-income countries, $12,746 or more. The least developed countries (LDC) are classified as per the 
criteria set by the United Nations Economic and Social Council.  
Details available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf 
Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) are classified according to the World Bank and IMF as part of their debt-relief 
initiative. These classifications are detailed in the World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) 2014 of the United 
Nations employed to delineate trends in various dimensions of the world economy. Also, refer Handbook on the Least 
Developed Country Category: Inclusion, Graduation and Special Support Measures (United Nations publication). Available 
from http://www.un.org/esa/analysis/devplan/cdppublications/2008cdphandbook.pdf 
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Political governance groupings 
 We consider seven well-acknowledged types of political governance systems: coalition-
governments countries (CC), federal democracies (FD) and parliamentary democracies (PD). 
In doing so, we are guided by the World Factbook of CIA
5
 and Encyclopedia Britannica. 
Table 3 provides the description of our sample based on political economy considerations. 
Table 3: Sample description for political governance groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for political governance groupings 
Period Coalition Countries (CC) Parliamentary Democracies (PD) Federal Democracies (FD) Total 
1980-2009 54 45 21 120 
Panel B:  Government Debt and GDP Growth in political governance groupings 
Countries Observations Countries 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
31 620 Coalition Countries (CC) 3.10% 3.24% 66.24 61.59 
14 280 Federal Democracies (FD) 3.11% 3.36% 54.26 54.83 
16 320 Parliamentary Democracies (PD) 3.03% 3.15% 67.81 65.12 
Total=61 1120 
     
 
Full sample  
 We explore the dimension of historical specificity by examining real GDP growth by 
government debt category for the period 1960-2009 (Table 4). We do not extend our dataset 
beyond 2009, in view of the sudden and significant rise in government debt levels consequent 
to the government interventions in response to global financial crisis
6
.  
 
Table 4: Sample description for full sample 
Period Countries observations 
GDP growth GGD 
Mean  Median Mean  Median 
1960-2009 43 1380 3.59% 3.75% 48.36 44.41 
  
 
                                                          
5 The World Factbook of The Central Intelligence Agency of United States provides information on the history, people, 
government, economy, geography, communications, transportation, military, and transnational issues for 267 world entities. 
Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/  
Encyclopedia Britannica | political system. Details available at http://www.britannica.com/print/topic/467746 
 
6 In industrial countries, government debt has risen significantly. In 2009, the net sovereign borrowing needs of the United 
Kingdom and the United States were five times larger than the average of the preceding five years (2002–07). The huge 
stimulus and bailout package adopted by the US government to deal with the crisis delivered by irresponsible financial 
agents in 2009 took the net government debt to GDP ratio in the U.S. from 42.6 in 2007 to 72.4 percent in 2011. In advanced 
economies as a whole, government debt to GDP ratios are expected to reach 110 percent by 2015—an increase of almost 40 
percentage points over pre-crisis levels (IMF 2010). Many middle-income countries also witnessed a deterioration of their 
debt positions, although the trends are not as dramatic as those of advanced economies are. In low-income countries, in 
2009–10 the present value of the government debt to GDP ratio has deteriorated by 5–7 percentage points compared with 
pre-crisis projections (IDA and IMF 2010). 
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Figure 1: Debt, Inflation and Growth 
1. Debt, inflation and growth: 1960–2009     2. Inflation and growth in median debt levels 
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Before beginning the discussion on the macroeconomic determinants of government 
debt, we provide an overview of the interaction of debt inflation and growth. We find 
inflation not necessarily influencing high debt levels across countries (Figure 1). The median 
debt levels have soared particularly during 1980-2000. However, the inflation levels have not 
experienced drastic and noticeable rise during the corresponding period. Median inflation and 
median GDP growth have mostly moved in tandem during the corresponding debt levels 
during 1960-2009 (Figure 1.2). The interaction of government debt with growth in the full 
sample suggesting the negative relationship is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Government debt and economic growth 
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Variables 
We provide in Table 5 the description of variables and data sources. 
Table 5: Description of variables and data sources 
Variable Description 
adr  
Age dependency ratio (% of 
working-age population) 
Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 or 
older than 64--to the working-age population--those ages 15-64. Data are 
shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population. 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) 
fce  
Final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
Final consumption expenditure is the sum of household final consumption 
expenditure (private consumption) and general government final consumption 
expenditure (general government consumption). Source: WDI 
fdi  
Foreign direct investment,  
net inflows (% of GDP) 
Foreign direct investments are the net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor.  
Source: WDI 
gdpgr (GDPgrowth) 
Real GDP growth (annual %) 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant 
local currency. Source: WDI 
gfc  
General government final 
consumption expenditure 
(annual % growth) 
Annual percentage growth of general government final consumption 
expenditure based on constant local currency. Source: WDI 
gfcf  
Gross fixed capital formation 
(annual % growth) 
Average annual growth of gross fixed capital formation based on constant 
local currency. Source: WDI 
ggd (debt) 
General government gross 
debt 
Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of 
interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the 
future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, currency and deposits, 
debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee 
schemes, and other accounts payable.   
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO) April 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff (RR) 
data set 
infl  
Inflation (annual %) 
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator 
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. Source: WDI 
pg  
Population growth (annual %) 
Annual population growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of 
midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. Source: WDI 
rir 
Real interest rate (%) 
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator.  
Source: WDI 
tgdp (openness) 
Trade (% of GDP) 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
share of gross domestic product. Source: WDI 
ulf 
Unemployed labour force 
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate). 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and 
unemployment differ by country. Source: WDI 
  
 
3. Macroeconomic Determinants of Government Debt 
 In this section, we undertake an econometric investigation for identifying the 
determinants of government debt and attempt to answer the much-debated question – What 
factors influence government debt in a sovereign country? Stable macroeconomic 
environment, political stability, and credible institutional stability not only facilitate the debt 
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market but also the level of government debt. Unstable economic environment impelled by 
volatility of output growth, hyperinflation, and lack of trade openness tend to affect the level 
of government debt.   
 
 On the macroeconomic front, monetary policy credibility is one of the important factors 
that determine the level of government debt. When monetary policy credibility is low, 
interest rates tend to be very high. Interest rates might explicate much about government’s 
decisions to issue debt and the nature of debt. Interest rates influence the rate at which new 
debt can be raised and hence affect the interest expenditure as well. Another monetary policy 
credibility proxy is the level of inflation. Countries with high and very high levels of inflation 
are less able to borrow on easy terms. Guscina (2008) shows that low and stable inflation is 
associated with higher domestic debt share in total central government debt. On the other 
hand, Forslund et al., (2011) find that inflationary history has no statistically significant effect 
on the composition of government debt. 
 
 The Keynesian School of economic thought justifies government debt, as a 
repercussion of government’s spending that is required to boost up the economy. The size of 
government’s final consumption has a bearing on government’s borrowings. Accordingly, 
general government final consumption expenditure significantly influences the borrowing 
decisions of the government, which in turn affects the government debt level. Governments 
raise debt to support public and profitable investment (in both physical infrastructures and 
human resources) by public spending. As the government seeks to boost the economy by 
undertaking fixed capital formation activity for enabling speedier growth of economy, the 
extent of growth of gross fixed capital formation affects the level of government debt. 
 
 Trade openness of countries should have a positive impact on the government debt on 
two counts: (i) more open countries suffer less from balance sheets effects associated with 
external borrowing (Calvo et al., 2003), and (ii) open countries may be more successful in 
attracting foreign investors into the domestic market. Further, in a recent post-crisis research, 
Aizenman et al., (2013) find that trade openness was the biggest factor behind Asia's lower 
sovereign spreads before the crisis, and inflation during and after the crisis. They also show 
that trade and financial openness, as well as foreign direct investment drove Asian emerging 
markets. We consider trade to GDP ratio as a proxy for the level of openness of the economy.  
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 Investment openness denoted by foreign direct investment level of a country suggests 
the ability of its economy to attract foreign investments. Greater levels of direct investment 
flows into the economy reduce the burden on the government’s external borrowings for its 
investment needs. Hence, higher levels of FDI flows affect the government debt negatively.   
 
 Theoretical possibilities include a rigorous application of optimal taxation theory to 
public debt determination. We attempt this by introducing final consumption expenditure as a 
much broader macroeconomic variable to proxy for fiscal policy. We consider final 
consumption expenditure as a measure of macroeconomic consumption of the economy. 
Final consumption expenditure is the sum of household final consumption expenditure 
(private consumption) and general government final consumption expenditure (government 
consumption). 
 
 We extend the theoretical foundations and introduce government final consumption 
expenditure as a macroeconomic variable for an explicit treatment of government spending. 
Final consumption expenditure can explain much of the trend in direct government spending 
(Egert, 2015). Direct government spending includes government final consumption 
expenditure, other payments by general government and net government fixed capital 
formation.  
 
 As Barro (1979) observes, existence of developed social safety nets partially financed 
by public deficits has a vital role as economic automatic stabilizers in responding to the 
increase of the unemployment rate. As a result, debt can grow in such circumstances to avoid 
distorting tax fluctuations. We assume that a large national government has jurisdiction over 
a population of exogenous size and hence ignore any effects of public debt policy on 
migration, which would otherwise be an important consideration for a local government. We 
consider population growth as a control variable in the country groupings. The proportion of 
dependents on working-age population is another macroeconomic factor that affects the level 
of debt. In theory, increasing burden on working population affects the fiscal position of the 
government negatively. Consequently, the increasing age dependency ratio would be 
associated negatively with public debt. Hence, we introduce age dependency ratio as a 
control variable in our specification. 
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Estimation strategy 
We use the data sets detailed in Section 2. We consider three broad country groupings 
based on the availability of complete data for all the variables under consideration. Economy 
groupings include advanced economies, emerging economies, developing economies, OECD 
countries, and BRICS. Income groupings include high-income countries, highly indebted 
poor countries, and middle-income countries. Political governance groupings include 
coalition countries, federal countries and parliamentary countries. Full sample for analysis 
includes 43 countries. Our econometric analysis based on specific country groupings helps in 
broadly identifying the country specific nature of the macroeconomic determinants of 
government debt in those countries. We have chosen our full sample and sub samples based 
on the availability of authentic data for all the required variables. Table 5 provides the 
description of variables and data sources.  
 
 Our econometric estimation employs eight proxies for macroeconomic explanatory 
variables: (i) Real GDP growth - measure of economic growth, (ii) final consumption 
expenditure - measure of macroeconomic consumption, (iii) general government final 
consumption expenditure - measure of government size, (iv) gross fixed capital formation - 
measure of the size of domestic investment, (v) foreign direct investment - measure of the 
size of foreign investment, (vi) inflation - measure of macroeconomic imbalance, (vi) real 
interest rate - measure of monetary policy credibility, (vii) trade openness - measure of 
macroeconomic openness, (viii) population growth, age dependency ratio, and unemployed 
labour force - measures of other socio-economic controls. Table 7 provides the correlations 
of the variables employed in the analysis.  
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Table 6: Summary statistics: Government debt to GDP ratio 
This table presents the summary statistics of government debt (debt to GDP) variable across all country groupings. 
Country groupings Period No. of countries Mean (μ) Standard deviation (σ) Median Min Max No. of Obs 
Economy groupings 
        
1. Advanced economies 1980-2009 22 61.91 31.32 60.18 6.31 210.25 588 
2. Emerging economies 1980-2009 11 46.37 21.60 44.64 3.89 154.90 214 
3. Developing economies 1980-2009 19 58.52 29.91 52.22 6.69 229.33 362 
4. OECD countries 1980-2009 25 59.05 31.50 57.20 3.89 210.25 546 
5. BRICS 1980-2009 5 56.14 16.63 61.50 27.36 81.76 140 
Income groupings 
        
1. High income countries 1980-2009 24 59.90 31.52 58.88 3.89 210.25 547 
2. Highly-indebted poor countries 1980-2009 8 69.17 41.16 56.54 18.67 229.33 210 
3. Middle income countries 1980-2009 18 57.95 30.40 51.30 6.69 229.33 343 
Political governance groupings 
        
1. Coalition countries 1980-2009 27 59.44 33.63 57.20 3.89 210.25 546 
2. Federal countries 1980-2009 17 55.32 23.37 53.35 9.71 154.90 314 
3. Parliamentary countries 1980-2009 14 59.75 33.26 57.58 6.31 131.80 250 
Full sample  1960-2009 43 59.14 31.07 55.95 3.89 229.33 891 
13 
 
 
Table 7: Correlations for determinants of government debt  
 
RIR ADR PG ULF GGD FDI GDPGR GFCF GFC TGDP FCE INFL 
Real interest rate (RIR) 1.000 
           
Age dependency ratio (ADR) 0.054 1.000 
          
Population growth (PG) -0.031 0.707 1.000 
         
Unemployed labour force (ULF) 0.079 0.114 0.178 1.000 
        
General government gross debt (GGD) 0.050 -0.174 -0.400 -0.025 1.000 
       
Foreign direct investment  (FDI) 0.067 -0.005 0.023 0.024 -0.213 1.000 
      
Real GDP growth (GDPGR) -0.085 0.081 0.109 0.046 -0.132 0.160 1.000 
     
Gross fixed capital formation  (GFCF) -0.090 0.058 0.132 -0.004 -0.136 0.175 0.756 1.000 
    
Government final consumption (GFC) -0.034 -0.054 0.094 0.003 -0.159 0.110 0.264 0.452 1.000 
   
Openness (TGDP) -0.172 0.110 -0.019 0.125 -0.059 0.218 0.142 0.043 0.033 1.000 
  
Final consumption expenditure (FCE) 0.320 0.458 0.199 0.101 0.084 -0.017 -0.056 -0.153 -0.219 -0.105 1.000 
 
Inflation (INFL) -0.045 0.103 0.087 0.000 0.043 -0.043 -0.127 0.029 0.076 -0.053 0.043 1.000 
Note: The correlations presented here are for the full sample of countries employed in the panel data analysis. 
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 We employ balanced-panel data for the analysis as it allows controlling for 
heterogeneity between countries. It is less likely to be plagued by collinearity between 
variables. As panel data provides information on variation between countries and within 
countries, the analysis can produce more reliable parameter estimates, with higher degrees of 
freedom and efficiency. Our specification assumes that the government debt for country ‘j’ 
conforms to a linear relationship over a period ‘t’ and is common across the panel of 
countries.  
 jttj
j
t
j
t XDebt 
 ------- Eqn (1) 
X
j
t
is a vector of regressors including lagged GDP, gfcf, gfc, tgdp, fce, fdi and infl. It also 
includes the constant. µj is country-specific fixed effects; νt is time-fixed effects; εjt is the 
unobservable error term.  
 jttj
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
jj
t
rir
fdiINFLtgdpgfcffcegfcGDPgrowthDebt t




1   
---- Eqn (2) 
 Given the strong potential for endogeneity of the debt variable, we use instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation technique. In our instrumental variables model, we instrument the 
Solow variables using their lagged variables. In Eqn (6.3), we introduce the control variables 
- adr, pg, and ulf. 
 jtt
j
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
jj
t
ulfpgadrrir
fdiINFLtgdpgfcffcegfcGDPgrowthDebt
j
t
j
t
t





1 ---- Eqn (3) 
  
 We use fixed period effects generalized methods of moments regressions with IV 
estimation for panel data. The unique feature of GMM estimation is that it provides a 
straightforward way to test the specification in models for which there are moment conditions 
than model parameters. We use White period GMM weights with cross-section weights 
(PCSE) standard errors & covariance. Many studies exploring panel data have made use of 
IV approach to deal with the issue of simultaneity bias Hiebert et al., (2002). With the use of 
GMM estimator, we seek to correct for the possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in 
the error structure by using the consistent estimator. The two-step GMM provides some 
efficiency gains over the traditional IV/2-SLS estimator derived from the use of the optimal 
weighting matrix, the over identifying restrictions of the model (Baum et al., 2013).  
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 We use panel-based unit root tests that are believed to have higher power than unit root 
tests based on individual time series for testing the unit roots. We compute the summary 
panel unit root test, using individual fixed effects as regressors, and automatic lag difference 
term and bandwidth selection (using the Schwarz criterion for the lag differences, and the 
Newey-West method and the Bartlett kernel for the bandwidth). The null of a unit root is 
tested using Levin, Lin & Chu test, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat test, ADF - Fisher Chi-
square test, and PP - Fisher Chi-square test. In case the variable/s is/are found to be stationary 
at the first difference, in such cases we bring in the differenced variable for analysis. 
 
Table 8: Macroeconomic Determinants of Government Debt  
This table presents the results of the Panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regressions for identifying 
the determinants of government debt in the full sample of countries for the period 1960-2009. Our dependent 
variable is the government debt. Column (1) presents the results of the regressions with macroeconomic 
determinants. Column (2) presents the results of the regressions with other control variables in addition to 
macroeconomic determinants. We use instrumental variables techniques with fixed effects and employ cross-
section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance. We report the coefficient values marked with significance 
levels in the first row followed by the standard errors (in the parenthesis) in the second row. Asterisks ***, ** 
indicate levels of significance at 1%, and 5% respectively. 
    
Explanatory Variables 
Mean/Std. 
Deviation (in italics) 
(1) (2) 
Real GDP growth  
3.11 -1.481*** -1.521* 
3.29 (0.343) (0.341) 
Final consumption expenditure 
77.79 0.475*** 0.512*** 
6.96 (0.181) (0.180) 
Foreign direct investment 
2.54 -1.086*** -1.093*** 
3.68 (0.349) (0.333) 
Government expenditure 
2.87 -0.425* -0.409* 
5.22 (0.210) (0.203) 
Inflation 
30.73 -0.002 -0.002 
449.08 (0.002) (0.002) 
Trade Openness 
62.76 0.173*** 0.150*** 
31.65 (0.039) (0.037) 
Gross fixed capital formation 
4.22 0.252*** 0.254*** 
12.14 (0.095) (0.094) 
Real interest rate 
7.82 0.034 0.039 
12.76 (0.084) (0.081) 
Age dependency ratio 
56.39 
 
-0.042 
10.04 
 
(0.151) 
Population growth 
1.09 
 
-7.030*** 
0.75 
 
(1.863) 
Unemployment 
8.34 
 
0.172 
4.93 
 
(0.203) 
Intercept  
19.194 27.830 
 
(15.750) (15.035) 
R-squared 
 
0.147 0.163 
16 
 
 
Table 9: Determinants of Debt in Economy groupings 
This table presents the results of the Panel Generalized Method of Moments regressions for identifying the determinants of government debt in economy groupings of 
countries. Our dependent variable is the government debt. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7) and (9) present the results of the regressions with macroeconomic determinants. 
Columns (2), (4), (6), (8) and (10) present the results of the regressions with other control variables in addition to macroeconomic determinants. We use instrumental 
variables techniques with fixed effects and employ cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance. We report the coefficient values marked with significance 
levels in the first row followed by the standard errors (in the parenthesis) in the second row. Asterisks ***, ** indicate levels of significance at 1%, and 5% respectively. 
 
      
    
 Advanced economies (AE) Emerging economies (EE) Developing economies (DE) OECD countries (OECD) BRICS 
Explanatory Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Real GDP growth  
-0.64 -0.27 -1.03*** -1.31*** -1.63*** -1.43*** -0.698 -0.282 -0.783 -0.156 
(0.653) (0.643) (0.206) (0.177) (0.335) (0.373) (0.543) (0.549) (0.793) (0.622) 
Final consumption 
expenditure 
0.99*** 0.67** 0.52*** 0.61*** 0.41** 1.17*** 0.50** 0.316* 2.85*** 1.32** 
(0.298) (0.268) (0.143) (0.174) (0.204) (0.231) (0.239) (0.232) (0.456) (0.433) 
Foreign direct investment 
-1.23** -0.66** -3.44*** -3.11*** -0.468 -0.017 -1.41*** -1.08*** 1.84* 1.381 
(0.372) (0.337) (0.479) (0.495) (0.513) (0.544) (0.361) (0.325) (0.941) (0.864) 
Government expenditure 
-2.78*** -2.61*** -0.104 -0.146 -0.093 -0.006 -1.53*** -1.65*** 0.082 0.222 
(0.584) (0.545) (0.155) (0.115) (0.219) (0.220) (0.357) (0.349) (0.319) (0.247) 
Inflation 
-1.86*** -1.38*** -0.004** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -1.392*** -0.347 -0.623 -0.167 
(0.357) (0.332) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.208) (0.254) (0.648) (0.602) 
Trade Openness 
0.18*** 0.14*** 0.007* 0.031* 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.78***   
(0.048) (0.047) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) (0.049) (0.099)   
Gross fixed capital formation 
0.04 0.0635 0.041 0.097 0.20** 0.24*** 0.026 0.118 0.68* 0.51* 
(0.185) (0.166) (0.065) (0.058) (0.084) (0.090) (0.167) (0.159) (0.311) (0.252) 
Real interest rate 
-0.648 -0.018*** 0.23*** 0.22** 0.114 0.065 -0.417 -0.083 -0.016   
(0.450) (0.412) (0.063) (0.068) (0.074) (0.086) (0.282) (0.280) (0.093)   
Age dependency ratio 
  -1.3625   -0.099   -0.97***   -0.71***   -1.63*** 
  (0.270)   (0.240)   (0.221)   (0.229)   (0.429) 
Population growth 
  -19.74***   2.288*   5.58*   -16.11***   -18.97*** 
  (2.726)   (4.477)   (2.946)   (2.657)   (5.276) 
Unemployment 
  1.20***   -0.71***   -0.37**   1.03***   -1.88*** 
  (0.255)   (0.195)   (0.221)   (0.225)   (0.164) 
Intercept 
-3.7193 85.89*** 15.112 7.573 18.818 15.813 23.785 76.03*** 315.07*** 254.3*** 
(24.314) (25.56) (11.802) (11.614) (16.994) 17.189) (20.035) (23.094) (38.115) (48.227) 
R-squared 0.2826 0.3997 0.634 0.750 0.379 0.321 0.240 0.334 0.950 0.966 
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Table 10: Determinants of Debt in Income groupings 
This table presents the results of the Panel Generalized Method of Moments regressions for identifying the determinants of government debt in income groupings of 
countries. Our dependent variable is the government debt. Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the results of the regressions with macroeconomic determinants. Columns 
(2), (4) and (6) present the results of the regressions with other control variables in addition to macroeconomic determinants. We use instrumental variables techniques 
with fixed effects and employ cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance. We report the coefficient values marked with significance levels in the first row 
followed by the standard errors (in the parenthesis) in the second row. Asterisks ***, ** indicate levels of significance at 1%, and 5% respectively. 
 
    
  
 High income countries (HIC) Highly-indebted poor countries (HPC) Middle income countries (MIC) 
Explanatory Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Real GDP growth  
-1.02** -0.07 -4.91*** -4.75*** -1.27*** -1.67*** 
(0.512) (0.510) (1.174) (1.211) (0.297) (0.309) 
Final consumption expenditure 
0.33 0.34 0.03 1.50 0.51*** 0.80*** 
(0.289) (0.268) (0.615) (1.066) (0.163) (0.180) 
Foreign direct investment 
-1.81*** -1.22*** -0.89 -3.56* -0.85* -0.54 
(0.403) (0.360) (1.712) (1.820) (0.504) (0.461) 
Government expenditure 
-2.70*** -2.66***     -0.18 -0.44*** 
0.516) (0.490)     (0.140) (0.127) 
Inflation 
(0.005 0.16* -0.0003 0.0004 0.003 0.002 
0.081) (0.088) (0.0027) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trade Openness 
0.19*** 0.17*** 1.26*** 0.83*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 
(0.050) (0.048) (0.245) (0.272) (0.033) (0.034) 
Gross fixed capital formation 
0.174 0.12     -0.014 0.12 
(0.158) (0.146)     (0.076) (0.079) 
Real interest rate 
-0.59*** -0.40***     0.32*** 0.24*** 
(0.157) (0.148)     (0.076) (0.082) 
Age dependency ratio 
  -1.403***   -4.64***   -0.65*** 
  (0.262)   (1.667)   (0.210) 
Population growth 
  -17.52***   8.93   -0.78 
  (2.518)   (13.958)   (4.214) 
Unemployment 
  0.96***       0.10 
  (0.243)       (0.182) 
Intercept 
38.70 108.42*** 15.82 279.73*** 10.93 32.62*** 
(24.363) (25.267) (60.948) (111.663) (13.281) (12.912) 
R-squared 0.2422 0.3582 0.7140 0.7612 0.5254 0.6926 
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Table 11: Determinants of Debt in Political governance groupings 
This table presents the results of the Panel Generalized Method of Moments regressions for identifying the determinants of government debt in political governance 
groupings of countries. Our dependent variable is the government debt. Columns (1), (3) and (5) present the results of the regressions with macroeconomic 
determinants. Columns (2), (4) and (6) present the results of the regressions with other control variables in addition to macroeconomic determinants. We use 
instrumental variables techniques with fixed effects and employ cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance. We report the coefficient values marked 
with significance levels in the first row followed by the standard errors (in the parenthesis) in the second row. Asterisks ***, ** indicate levels of significance at 1%, and 
5% respectively. 
 
      
 Coalition countries (CC) Federal countries (FC) Parliamentary democracies (PD) 
Explanatory Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Real GDP growth  
-1.25** -0.95** -0.75 -1.03** -1.38 -0.89 
(0.509) (0.499) (0.468) (0.470) (0.848) (0.707) 
Final consumption expenditure 
0.70** 0.05 0.63** 0.51** 1.24*** 2.30*** 
(0.302) (0.277) (0.253) (0.259) (0.320) (0.267) 
Foreign direct investment 
-1.56*** -1.56*** 0.39 0.66 -1.60*** -0.44*** 
(0.367) (0.318) (0.453) (0.460) (0.442) (0.329) 
Government expenditure 
-0.37 -0.36 -0.52 -0.54* -0.86** -0.12 
(0.352) (0.356) (0.323) (0.327) (0.385) (0.262) 
Inflation 
-0.51** -0.01 0.34*** 0.27** -0.86 -0.90*** 
(0.240) (0.228) (0.103) (0.123) (0.417) (0.33) 
Trade Openness 
0.17*** 0.15*** 0.28*** 0.15** 0.38*** 0.24*** 
(0.040) (0.048) (0.075) (0.063) (0.069) (0.069) 
Gross fixed capital formation 
0.31*** 0.32*** 0.40*** 0.36** -0.12 -0.038 
(0.118) (0.120) (0.158) (0.163) (0.254) (0.176) 
Real interest rate 
-0.19 -0.01 0.28*** 0.20** -0.37 -0.80 
(0.136) (0.136) (0.103) (0.097) (0.704) (0.565) 
Age dependency ratio 
  -0.33   -0.10   -0.44 
  (0.295)   (0.292)   (0.420) 
Population growth 
  -13.68***   2.10   -12.71*** 
  (2.540)   (2.516)   (3.409) 
Unemployment 
  1.83   -0.98**   4.03*** 
  (0.373)   (0.183)   (0.398) 
Intercept 
1.74 66.49*** -14.01 3.58 -41.62* -124.18*** 
(24.878) (24.757) (22.561) (20.369) (23.696) (24.924) 
R-squared 0.1925 0.2819 0.2866 0.2771 0.3041 0.5375 
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Robustness Checks 
In order to ascertain whether the empirical results are robust, we explore three routes. 
First, we investigate the robustness of the results with respect to the presence of outliers, and 
find that outliers do not drive the main results. Second, we investigate the robustness of the 
results by performing various iterations of regression analysis. Results presented are robust to 
modifications after duly considering the potential biases resulting from the omitted variables. 
The recent literature suggests that panel-based unit root tests have higher power than unit root 
tests based on individual time series. We find that the results pass the tests of robustness 
checks. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 The results of the analysis employing the full sample are presented in Table 8. We 
notice that real GDP growth has a significant negative effect on the debt. For every 1.0 
percentage point growth in real GDP growth, there is a decline in government debt in the 
range of 1.48 to 1.52 percentage points. Trade openness has a significant positive effect on 
inflation. For every one-percentage point growth in trade openness, the rise in debt is in the 
range of 0.15 to 0.17 percent.  
 
 Gross fixed capital formation has a significant positive correlation with debt. For every 
percentage point rise in gross fixed capital formation, we notice a corresponding rise in the 
range of 0.252 to 0.254 percent in debt. We notice a significant positive relationship of final 
consumption expenditure with debt. For every percentage point increase in final consumption 
expenditure in the economy, there appears to be rise of debt in the range of 0.475 to 0.512 
percent. However, government expenditure is found to have no positive relationship with 
debt. These results provide evidence to our hypothesis that while gross fixed capital 
formation and final consumption expenditure provide an enabling environment for investors, 
the rising government expenditure does not find favour with the investors.  
 
 Influx of capital through foreign direct investment contributes to decline debt. 
Accordingly, our results suggest a statistically significant negative effect of FDI on debt. For 
every percentage point increase in FDI, there appears to be reduction of debt in the range of 
1.08 to 1.09 percent. The association of real interest rate with debt is found to be positive but 
not statistically significant. For every percentage rise in real interest rate, there appears to be 
a rise in debt in the range of 0.034% to 0.039%.  
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 Population growth appears to have a negative association with debt. This supports the 
economic rationale that investors tend to desist in countries with very high growth in 
population. In theory, unemployment can be statistically insignificant in positively affecting 
debt when the governments are able to meet the social security and public safety needs met 
by public finance. Our results are in line with the expectations. Further, we notice a 
statistically significant negative effect of age dependency ratio on debt.  
 
 We present in Table 9, the results of the analysis of determinants of debt in economy 
groupings. In all economy groupings, we notice a statistically significant negative effect of  
real GDP growth on the debt. For every 1.0 percentage point growth in real GDP growth, 
there is a decline in government debt in the range of 0.27% – 0.64% for advanced economies 
(AE), 1.03% – 1.31% for emerging economies (EE), 1.43% – 1.63% for developing 
economies (DE), 0.28% – 0.69% for OECD countries and 0.15% – 0.78% for BRICS. In all 
the economy groupings, final consumption expenditure in the economy has a statistically 
significant positive association with debt. The positive association with debt is in the range of 
0.99% – 0.67% for AE, 0.52% – 0.61% for EE, 0.41% – 1.17% for DE, 0.50% – 0.31% for 
OECD and 1.32% – 2.85% for BRICS for every percentage point rise in final consumption 
expenditure. Gross fixed capital formation has a positive effect on debt in all the economy 
groupings. The positive correlation with debt is in the range of 0.04% – 0.06% for AE, 0.04% 
– 0.09% for EE, 0.2% – 0.24% for DE, 0.02% – 0.11% for OECD and 0.68% – 0.51% for 
BRICS for every percentage point rise in gross fixed capital formation. Trade openness has a 
statistically significant positive association with debt. For every percentage point increase in 
trade openness, we find rise in debt in the range of 0.14% – 0.18% for AE, 0.007% – 0.03% 
for EE, 0.15% – 0.17% for DE, 0.13% – 0.21% for OECD and 0.68% – 0.78% for BRICS. 
 
 We notice a statistically negative effect of FDI on debt. For every percentage point 
growth in FDI, we find upsurge of debt in the range of 0.66% – 1.23% for AE, 3.11% – 
3.44% for EE, 0.017% – 0.46% for DE, 1.08% – 1.41% for OECD and 1.38% – 1.84% for 
BRICS. We are particularly pleased with the result that EE experience largest negative effect 
on debt amongst the groupings. It provides evidence to our argument that EE are attracting 
higher flows of FDI. Government expenditure has a statistically significant negative effect on 
debt. The results suggest that for every percentage point rise in government expenditure, debt 
experiences a decline in the range of 2.61% - 2.78% for AE, 0.10% - 0.14% for EE, 0.06%-
0.09% for DE, 1.53% - 1.65% for OECD and 0.08% - 0.22% for BRICS. 
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 Population growth has a statistically negative effect on debt in advanced, OECD and 
BRICS countries. Unemployment is observed to have a statistically negative effect on debt in 
EE, DE and BRICS countries. The results suggest that these countries need to step up their 
public finance for social safety requirements in order to offset the ill effects of 
unemployment. On the other hand, we notice a positive effect in the case of AE and OECD 
countries. Further, we notice a statistically significant negative effect of age dependency ratio 
on debt supporting our argument that mounting burden on working population negatively 
affects the fiscal position of the government, which in turn has a negative effect on public 
debt. Other determinants display the coefficients in line with our economic articulations of 
theory. 
 
 The results for the analysis of determinants of debt in income groupings are presented 
in Table 10. In all income groupings of countries, we notice a statistically significant negative 
effect of real GDP growth on the debt. For every percentage point growth in real GDP 
growth, there is a decline in government debt in the range of 0.07% – 1.02% for high-income 
countries (HIC), 4.75% – 4.91% for highly indebted poor countries (HPC), 1.27% – 1.67% 
for middle income countries (MIC). These results support our argument that higher growth 
tends to have a negative effect on debt. In all the income groupings, final consumption 
expenditure in the economy has a positive association with debt. The statistically significant 
effect in the case of MIC implies that these countries suffer from lower levels of consumption 
expenditure in their economies. 
 
 We notice a statistically negative effect of FDI on debt across all the income groupings. 
For every percentage point growth in FDI, we find upsurge of debt in the range of 1.22% – 
1.81% for HIC, 0.89% – 3.56% for HPC, and 0.54% – 0.85% for MIC. The highest effect 
among the groups is observed in HIC, which supports our argument that these countries have 
been able to attract higher FDI flows. Trade openness has statistically significant positive 
effect on debt in line with our theoretical propositions. The range of effect is found to be 
higher in the case of highly indebted poor countries (0.83% to 1.26%).  
 
 One notable observation in the case of HPC is about the government final consumption 
expenditure. Since the governments of these countries suffer from highly imbalanced fiscal 
conditions, they suffer from insignificant consumption expenditure that has no relevance in 
the model. 
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 We now analyse the results for the analysis of determinants of debt in political 
governance groupings presented in Table 11. In all sub-groupings of countries, we notice a 
negative effect of real GDP growth on the debt. However, we notice insignificance of the 
effect in parliamentary democracies (PDs). It suggests that real GDP growth in these 
countries is not significant enough to affect public debt negatively and offers evidence to our 
viewpoint that PDs experience lower GDP growth compared to coalition countries (CCs) and 
federal democracies (FDs) (refer Table 3). Therefore, PDs experience higher level of public 
debt compared to other groupings. For every percentage point growth in real GDP growth, 
there is a decline in government debt in the range of 0.95% – 1.25% in CCs, 0.75% – 1.03% 
in FCs, and 0.89% – 1.38% in PDs. 
 
 We notice an insignificant effect of FDI on debt in federal countries (FCs) which 
perhaps indicates that these countries experience lower levels of FDI compared to other 
groups of countries. Further, as the FCs experience high levels of inflation compared to other 
groups countries, inflation has a statistically significant negative effect on debt. Though other 
groups of countries also display similar effect, the statistical significance is lesser in those 
groups. This result provides empirical evidence to our argument that countries with inflation 
under control can attract debt on much convenient terms than those with higher levels of 
inflation. 
 
 A notable observation is that PDs experience statistically insignificant negative effect 
of gross fixed capital formation on debt. Since the governments of these countries suffer from 
highly imbalanced fiscal conditions, they undergo insignificant gross fixed capital formation 
that fails to attract sovereign debt creditors.  
 
 We notice an interesting phenomenon related to population growth in FCs. We find 
population growth not affecting the debt negatively contrary to the statistically significant 
negative effect observed in CCs and PDs. This is perhaps due to the reason that in FCs, 
population growth is not perceived as an economic problem for the lenders. We find an 
improved situation of unemployment in CCs compared to FCs and PDs. In line with our 
economic logic, unemployment has no statistically significant impact on debt in CCs. On the 
other hand, we notice its statistically significant negative effect in the case of FCs and PDs. 
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4. Testing for Causality 
 Our first caveat about our results concerns causality. Although we use lagged values of 
the explanatory variables and employ GMM IV instruments, we cannot make any claim that 
our estimations uncover a causal relationship going from the explanatory variables to debt. 
In this section, we run panel data specific causality testing. We perform panel Granger 
causality that is computed by running bivariate regressions. In our setting to perform this 
causality testing, least squares regressions can take the below mentioned form of bivariate 
regression in a panel data: 
 
 titiitiitiltiiti xxyyy ,1,,11,,11,1,1,0, ......   ---- Eqn (6.4.1) 
 
 titiitiitiltiiti yyxxx ,1,,11,,11,1,1,0, ......   ---- Eqn (6.4.2) 
 
for all possible pairs of series in the group. “t” denotes the time period dimension of the panel 
and “i” denotes the cross-sectional dimension of the panel. We pair each of the regressors 
employed in panel GMM with our focus variable debt. First, we run the Granger causality in 
the standard way and then adopt the one suggested by Demitrescu-Hurlin (2012) that makes 
an extreme opposite assumption, allowing all coefficients to be different across cross-
sections. We produce here below the results of the panel Granger causality tests for the full 
sample analysis. 
 
 According to the results of panel granger causality tests (Table 12), the p-values are 
significant for (1), (2), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11). Hence, we reject the null 
hypotheses of the tests. Accordingly, it is implied that: (i) GDP growth homogeneously 
granger cause debt (ii) final consumption expenditure homogeneously granger cause debt (iii) 
inflation homogeneously granger cause debt (iv) trade openness homogeneously granger 
cause debt (v) gross fixed capital formation homogeneously granger cause debt (vi) real 
interest rate homogeneously granger cause debt (vii) age dependency ratio homogeneously 
granger cause debt (viii) population growth homogeneously granger cause debt and (ix) 
Unemployment homogeneously granger cause debt. As the p-values are not significant for (3) 
and (4), we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, it appears that Granger causality runs 
one-way from: (i) debt to FDI and (ii) debt to government expenditure.   
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Table 12: Results of Pairwise Demitrescu-Hurlin Panel Causality Tests 
This table presents the results of the analysis of panel data for the period 1960-2009 for the full sample 
employing the lag criterion of 2 lags. 
        
Specifi 
cation  
 Null Hypothesis: 
W-
Stat. 
Zbar-
Stat. 
Prob.  
1 
 GDP growth does not homogeneously cause debt 5.3281 9.8215 0.0000 
 Debt does not homogeneously cause GDP growth 4.0762 6.0041 0.0000 
2 
 Final consumption expenditure does not homogeneously cause debt 3.5257 4.2742 0.0000 
 Debt does not homogeneously cause final consumption expenditure 4.0881 5.9772 0.0000 
3 
 FDI does not Granger cause Debt 1588.0 0.2773 0.7578 
 Debt does not Granger cause FDI   4.3478 0.0131 
4 
 Government expenditure does not Granger cause debt 1889.0 2.0187 0.1331 
 Debt does not Granger cause Government expenditure   19.1206 0.0000 
5 
 Inflation does not homogeneously cause debt 4.7936 8.1916 0.0000 
 Debt does not homogeneously cause Inflation 8.4004 19.1906 0.0000 
6 
 Trade Openness does not homogeneously cause debt 3.0693 2.9477 0.0032 
Debt does not homogeneously cause Trade Openness 4.7843 8.1901 0.0000 
7 
 Gross fixed capital formation does not Granger cause debt 1783.0 7.4081 0.0006 
 Debt does not Granger cause Gross fixed capital formation   16.7611 0.0000 
8 
 Real interest rate does not Granger cause debt 1223.0 5.1074 0.0062 
 Debt does not Granger cause Real interest rate   1.4189 0.2424 
9 
 Age dependency ratio does not homogeneously cause debt 4.5297 7.4432 0.0000 
 Debt does not homogeneously cause Age dependency ratio 12.975 33.3368 0.0000 
10 
 Population growth does not homogeneously cause debt 3.0747 2.982 0.0029 
 Debt does not homogeneously cause Population growth 5.2784 9.73773 0.0000 
11 
 Unemployment does not Granger cause debt 981.0 12.9934 0.0000 
 Debt does not Granger cause Unemployment   8.11758 0.0003 
        
 
 The above results of panel granger causality infer that the causation for growth of 
government debt runs from its macroeconomic determinants:  real GDP growth, final 
consumption expenditure, inflation, trade openness, gross fixed capital formation, real 
interest rate, age dependency, population growth, and unemployment to debt. However, the 
direction of causation from FDI to debt and government expenditure to debt is statistically 
insignificant. In identifying the macroeconomic determinants of debt, these results provide 
econometric proof of causation to our panel GMM regression results.  We have shown in this 
section that macroeconomic factors such as: real GDP growth, final consumption 
expenditure, inflation, trade openness, gross fixed capital formation, real interest rate, age 
dependency, population growth, and unemployment have statistically significant effect on the 
growth of government debt.  
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5. Conclusion 
 This study has presented a thorough data–rich analysis of macroeconomic determinants 
of government debt. It spans across different debt regimes and involves a worldwide sample 
of countries that is more representative. The sources on which the study draws are more 
authentic and well accepted. We do not claim that the results are infallible, but do state that 
they are based on widely accepted econometric tools and techniques besides sound economic 
logic. The study provides an original analysis of the debt and growth beyond the popular 
discourse mostly surrounding the advanced countries.  
 
 This study offers an econometric investigation for identifying the macroeconomic 
determinants of government debt and attempt to answer the much-debated question – What 
factors influence government debt in a sovereign country? First, we have analysed the full 
sample and then provided analyses for economy groupings, political governance groupings 
and income groupings. The results of the full sample analysis reveal that real GDP growth, 
foreign direct investment, government expenditure, inflation and population growth have 
negative effect on debt. Gross fixed capital formation, final consumption expenditure, and 
trade openness have positive effect on debt.     
 
 We find that parliamentary democracies experience higher level of government debt 
compared to other groupings as they suffer from low levels of real GDP growth. 
Parliamentary democracies experience negative effect of gross fixed capital formation on 
debt. Since the governments of these countries suffer from highly imbalanced fiscal 
conditions, they undergo insignificant gross fixed capital formation that fails to attract 
sovereign debt creditors. The study finds an interesting phenomenon related to population 
growth in federal countries. Population growth in these countries does not affect government 
debt negatively contrary to the negative effect observed in coalition countries and 
parliamentary democracies. This is perhaps due to the reason that in federal countries’ 
population growth is not as high an economic problem for the lenders. 
 
 To establish causality running from the determinants of debt, we employed the panel 
Granger causality testing. The results infer that the causation for growth of government debt 
runs from its macroeconomic determinants: real GDP growth, final consumption expenditure, 
inflation, trade openness, gross fixed capital formation, real interest rate, age dependency, 
population growth, and unemployment to debt.  
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Appendices 
Annexure 1: Countries covered in Economy groupings 
1 
Advanced Countries 
(27) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
2 BRICS (5) Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
3 
Developing Countries 
(57) 
Albania, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, 
Cameroon, China, Colombia, Congo, Congo Rep, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic,  Lesotho, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and 
Zambia 
4 
Emerging economies 
(21) 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.  
5 OECD Countries (33) 
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and United States. 
 
 
 
Annexure 2: Countries covered in Income groupings 
1 
High Income Countries 
HIC (38) 
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, 
China, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad 
and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States 
2 
Highly indebted Poor 
Countries HPC (16) 
Bolivia, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo DR, Congo R, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Honduras, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Uganda, and Zambia. 
3 
Middle Income 
Countries (34) 
Albania, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
China, Colombia, Congo R, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mauritius,  
Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, South 
Africa, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela 
 
 
 
Annexure 3: Countries covered in Political economy groupings 
1 Coalition Countries (31) 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Panama, Portugal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and 
United Kingdom. 
2 Federal Democracies (14) 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, 
India, Mexico, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. 
3 
Parliamentary 
Democracies (16) 
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, and Turkey. 
 
